

In subparagraph 37-d, relating to U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed deletion of the sentence in brackets as follows:

*"Maintain a military assistance program, primarily in the form of procurement assistance arrangements and training for the Saudi Arabian armed forces for internal security purposes. Continue to cooperate with Saudi Arabia at the Dhahran Airfield in accordance with existing agreements. [Should the Saudi Arabian Government seek the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. facilities at Dhahran or should the rights there be substantially curtailed, be prepared to reduce or withdraw personnel on the most favorable basis for the United States.] Anticipate a request for a substantial change in United States relationships at Dhahran upon expiration of the present agreement (1962)."*

In subparagraph 38-b, relating to U.S. policy toward Jordan, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization and Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives suggested deletion of the sentence in brackets as follows:

*"Bearing in mind that an abrupt change in Jordan's status would be viewed generally as a political defeat for the West, be prepared in the interim, for essentially political reasons, to provide necessary assistance which might be used for economic development, budgetary support, and military assistance. [Seek to transfer to Jordan's Arab neighbors major responsibility for economic support of Jordan if at all possible.]"*

In subparagraph 39-a, relating to U.S. policy to Iraq, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deletion of the sentence in brackets as follows:

*"Seek to maintain friendly relations with the new Iraqi regime on a reciprocal basis. [Continue to offer United States technical assistance as an indication of friendship and with a view to limiting Soviet influence.]"*

In paragraph 36, concerning U.S. policy toward the United Arab Republic, representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Departments of Defense and the Treasury suggested the deletion of the entire text of subparagraph 36-a, which reads as follows:

*"Seek to normalize relations with the UAR. While recognizing our fundamental differences with Nasser, deal with him as head of the UAR on specific problems and issues affecting the UAR's legitimate interests, but not as leader of the Arab world."*